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I. INTRODUCTION 
Debra was murdered in her Overland Park driveway on January 5, 
2012.1  Her husband fired multiple bullets into her body after ambushing 
her outside of her home.2  Debra had a protection order against her 
husband, entered in November 2011.3 
Passersby found Shaunda’s dead body under the playground 
equipment of a Kansas City park on June 14, 2014.4  Video of the park 
shows Shaunda fleeing from a man who caught up with her, grabbed her, 
and led her to the playground.5  The man is later shown leaving the park 
alone.6  A firearm and shell casings were recovered from the crime 
scene.7  Shaunda had a temporary protection order against the man.8  Her 
murderer, just days before, had smashed her face with a spiked bat and 
slashed all of her tires.9 
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 1. Tony Rizzo, Devastated by Loss of Debra Beaver, Friends Raise Domestic Violence 
Awareness, The Kansas City Star (Aug. 24, 2014, 8:25 PM), www.kansascity.com/news/local/ 
article1288942.html.  
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  KCPD: Woman’s Body Found in Playground at Apartment Complex in Kansas City, Mo., 
41 KSHB KANSAS CITY (June 4, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://www.kshb.com/news/crime/kcpd-homic 
ide-investigation-underway-after-womans-body-is-found-in-kansas-city-playground. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Id. 
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Bobbi got a protection order against her husband in January 2006.10  
Two weeks later, he showed up at her home in Clay County, Missouri, 
fired a rifle into the air, and chased after Bobbi.11  When he caught up to 
Bobbi, he shot her to death in her neighbor’s front yard.12 
Rose Mary has lived with a bullet in her head since 1997.13  At a 
protection order hearing, she informed the court that her husband 
“threatened to kill her every time she tried to leave him.”14  The judge 
entered the order.15  Unfortunately, Rose Mary’s husband attempted to 
make good on his threat and fired a bullet into her temporal lobe weeks 
later.16 
All of the aforementioned women were victims of intimate partner 
violence (IPV).  Their stories might have been different had the court 
required the men subject to protection orders to surrender their guns or 
prohibited them from purchasing one.  Unfortunately, many states do not 
prescribe such a measure.17  Kansas is among them.18 
IPV is a global epidemic, one that often results in homicide.19  While 
victims are murdered in a multitude of ways, the weapon of choice in the 
United States appears to be the firearm.20  Studies reveal that “[o]ver the 
past 25 years in the U.S., more intimate partner homicides have been 
committed with guns than with all other weapons combined.”21  In fact, 
much of the gun violence in the United States is a product of IPV.22  In 
2011, intimate partners or family members were responsible for the 
                                                          
 10.  Murdered Women in Kansas, KANSAS STATE UNIV., http://www.k-state.edu/care/”old/ 
materials/Murdered%20Women%20in%20Kansas.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015). 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Amy Karan & Helen Stampalia, Domestic Violence and Firearms: A Deadly Combination, 
79 FLA. B.J. 79, 79 (2005). 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  See Guns and Violence Against Women: America’s Uniquely Lethal Domestic Violence 
Problem, EVERYTOWN FOR GUN SAFETY 6, 14–30 (2014), http://everytown.org/documents/2014/ 
10/guns-and-violence-against-women.pdf [hereinafter EVERYTOWN] (noting that only twenty-three 
states and the District of Columbia prohibit people subject to domestic violence protective orders 
from possessing guns, excluding Kansas). 
 18.  Id. at 19. 
 19.  News Release, Violence Against Women: A Global Health Problem of Epidemic 
Proportions, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (June 20, 2013), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/ 
2013/violence_against_women_20130620/en/ (explaining that 38% of women murdered worldwide 
are killed by an intimate partner).  
 20.  EVERYTOWN, supra note 17. 
 21.  Id. at 5. 
 22.  Id. at 2 (explaining that an “astonishing” share of gun violence is driven by domestic 
violence). 
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homicides of at least fifty-three percent of women murdered in the 
United States.23 
Congress has attempted to attack the problem created when IPV and 
guns collide, but its efforts are routinely thwarted at the state level.24  
Two pieces of federal legislation aim to force firearms out of the hands 
of abusers, but leave the implementation of firearm removal to the 
individual states.25  While the federal government has the ability to 
prosecute when these amendments are violated,26 this does little to 
prevent abusers from accessing the guns in the first place.  To remove the 
murder weapons from known abusers, the states must focus on their own 
civil protection order process.  This is of increasing importance today 
because of the state trend to nullify federal gun laws.27  While the 
constitutionality of these laws has been called into question,28 the trend 
still causes concern.  If these state laws are given effect, any protections 
awarded by federal firearm restrictions will evaporate.29 
This Comment focuses on Kansas, calling for reform of the state’s 
protective order statute.  The reform should bring the following changes: 
(1) mandatory confiscation of all firearms and prohibition of firearm 
purchase while an abuser is subject to a temporary or permanent 
protective order because of actual, attempted, or threatened physical 
abuse; (2) judicial opportunity to mandate firearm confiscation and 
prohibition of purchase upon entrance of a temporary or permanent 
protection order because of non-physical forms of abuse; (3) expansion 
of the definition of abuse and mandatory protection order entrance upon 
a showing of such abuse; and (4) a process for expedited appellate 
review of judicial denial of an order.  Part II of this Comment explains 
IPV and its dynamics and provides a background on the current state of 
the law.  Part III proposes reform and discusses the most likely counter 
                                                          
 23.  Id. at 5.  
 24.  Emily J. Sack, Confronting the Issue of Gun Seizure in Domestic Violence Cases, 6 J. CTR. 
FOR FAM., CHILD. & THE CTS. 3, 3 (2005) (explaining that many state laws have significant gaps and 
inconsistencies with federal law due to the confusion among enforcement agencies and the courts’ 
confusion about their proper role in enforcing the laws).  
 25.  Id. at 7–8; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(8)–(9) (2012). 
 26.  Sack, supra note 24, at 5. 
 27.  Lois Beckett, Nullification: How States Are Making It a Felony to Enforce Federal Gun 
Laws, PROPUBLICA (May 2, 2013, 2:01 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/nullification-how-
states-are-making-it-a-felony-to-enforce-federal-gun-laws (describing the wave of nullification laws 
throughout the United States). 
 28.  Id. (explaining that U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder wrote a letter to Kansas Governor 
Sam Brownback asserting that Kansas’s newly-enacted gun law is unconstitutional).  
 29.  Keely N. Kight, Back to the Future: The Revival of the Theory of Nullification, 65 MERCER 
L. REV. 521, 552–53 (2014). 
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argument—that such reform is a Second Amendment violation.  While 
this reform proposal focuses on Kansas alone, many states could 
reevaluate their protective order processes to fight IPV and save victims’ 
lives.  The model this Comment proposes can serve as a model for all 
states in their efforts to end such abuse. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. What is Intimate Partner Violence? 
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is largely misunderstood.  Defined as 
“physical, sexual, or psychological harm by a current or former partner 
or spouse,”30 experts reveal that IPV is far-reaching, dynamic, and has 
nothing to do with common relationship incompatibilities.31  IPV is not 
about anger, lost tempers, or private arguments.32  IPV is about power 
and control.33  Research shows that the violence occurs because “one 
person feels they are entitled to control another.”34  IPV is not the result 
of something that the victim did, or failed to do, but is instead the result 
of some “external event or the internal state” of the abuser.35 
IPV comes in many forms, including verbal, physical, psychological, 
sexual, and economic abuse.36  In her book exploring the nature of IPV, 
Lenore Walker explains that the abuse occurs in a three-stage cycle.37  
This cycle begins with a “tension-building phase,” when there are often 
verbal assaults or minor incidents of abuse that make the victim feel as if 
she38 is walking on eggshells.39  This stage is followed by the “acute 
                                                          
 30.  Intimate Partner Violence: Definitions, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/intimatepartnerviolence/definitions.html (last visited May 
21, 2015). 
 31.  Why Do Abusers Batter?, THE ALA. COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://www.aca 
dv.org/abusers.html (last visited May 21, 2015) [hereinafter ACADV]. 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Mary P. Brewster, Domestic Violence Theories, Research, and Practice Implications, in 
HANDBOOK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE INTERVENTION STRATEGIES: POLICIES, PROGRAMS, & LEGAL 
REMEDIES 23, 30 (Albert R. Roberts, ed. 2002). 
 34.  What is Domestic Violence, NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,  http://www.nca 
dv.org/need-support/what-is-domestic-violence (last visited May 21, 2015) [hereinafter NCADV]. 
 35.  Sharon L. Gold, Note, Why Are Victims of Domestic Violence Still Dying at the Hands of 
Their Abusers? Filling the Gap in State Domestic Violence Gun Laws, 91 KY. L.J. 935, 938 (2003). 
 36.  NCADV, supra note 34. 
 37.  LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 56–59 (1979). 
 38.  Because eighty-five percent of IPV victims are women at the hands of men, and for ease of 
understanding, this Comment will use female pronouns to describe victims and male pronouns to 
describe abusers.  See infra note 45 and accompanying text.  
 39.  WALKER, supra note 37, at 56–59. 
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battering incident,” which is usually a severe form of violence that can 
result in injury or death.40  Finally, the victim experiences “the 
honeymoon stage,” when the abuser showers her with gifts, 
compliments, and apologies, promising to never commit another act of 
abuse or violence.41  This cycle is often integral to the abuser’s efforts to 
convince the victim to stay.42  The first phase begins again after the 
“honeymoon stage,” and the cycle continues.43 
IPV is not limited to one race, socioeconomic class, or by sexual 
orientation, but instead spans all classes of people.44  However, IPV 
disproportionately affects women.45  According to statistics compiled by 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the violence to 
which these women fall victim is epidemic;46 one in three women will 
report surviving some type of IPV in her lifetime.47  The CDC estimates 
that 6,982,000 U.S. women experience domestic violence in a twelve-
month period.48 
B. How does a Victim Combat Intimate Partner Violence? 
While it is becoming more common to focus on eliminating the 
abuse to stop IPV, the general feeling remains that if a victim wants the 
abuse to end she should leave the relationship.49  Because of this societal 
attitude, it is important to explain the difficulties involved with leaving 
an abusive relationship to demonstrate that the answer to IPV does not lie 
with the victim. 
When a woman is being abused by an intimate partner, she faces a 
series of difficult decisions.  The first is whether she should attempt to do 
anything about the abuse.  There are many reasons why the victim may 
                                                          
 40.  Id. at 59–65. 
 41.  Id. at 65–70. 
 42.  See Gold, supra note 35, at 939 (explaining the factors that perpetuate the cycle). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 937. 
 45.  See Jennifer L. Vainik, Kiss, Kiss, Bang, Bang: How Current Approaches to Guns & 
Domestic Violence Fail to Save Women’s Lives, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (2007) (reporting that 
eighty-five percent of IPV victims are women whose abusers are men). 
 46.  See Michele C. Black et al., The National Intimate Partner and Sexual Violence Survey, 
NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL 1 (2011), http://www.cdc.gov/violence 
prevention/pdf/nisvs_report2010-a.pdf (“Sexual violence, stalking, and intimate partner violence are 
major public health problems in the United States.”). 
 47.  Id. at 2. 
 48.  Id. at 38. 
 49.  DAWN BRADLEY BERRY, THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SOURCEBOOK 116–17 (1995). 
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elect to do nothing.50  First, the level of psychological manipulation in 
IPV is high, and often the victim inherently believes that the abuse is her 
fault.51  She takes full responsibility for the abuse and feels that if she can 
just be a better partner, the violence will stop.52  Second, the victim is 
often deeply in love with her abuser.53  Because the abuse generally starts 
later in the relationship, intricate feelings of love, loyalty, and affection 
will already exist when the violence begins.54  It may be difficult for a 
person to jeopardize a relationship like this, especially if one truly 
believes the “difficulties” arise from personal fault and failure.55  Third, 
children are often involved.56  This complicates a decision to take action, 
either because a victim is afraid that the children will lose access to a 
father figure or that she herself will lose access to the children.57  Finally, 
there is the very real risk of victim blaming.58  As history has shown, 
female IPV survivors are often blamed for the abuse, or ostracized once 
they reach out.59  This is evident in the first question that our society 
often asks about an IPV situation: “Why doesn’t she leave?”60  Attitudes 
are beginning to change, but it is slow moving, and a victim is right to 
assume that she may be publicly blamed, humiliated, or cut off from any 
support circle she has managed to maintain.61 
Should the victim decide she will fight her instincts to try to be a 
better partner, protect her children, or avoid public shaming, she then 
must decide if it is more dangerous to do something about the abuse or to 
try and live through it.  Because perpetrators of IPV try to keep control 
over their victims, any sense that they are losing that control will likely 
provoke more violence, or even homicide.62  When a victim decides to 
risk this, she may first approach the idea of batterer’s intervention or 
counseling.63  Because this does not often work, the victim who braves 
                                                          
 50.  Id. at 116. 
 51.  Id. at 117. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Dynamics of Domestic Abuse, DOMESTIC ABUSE PROJECT, http://www.domesticabuse 
project.com/get-educated/dynamics-of-domestic-abuse/ (last visited May 21, 2015) (explaining that 
these societal myths about domestic violence leaves victims feeling isolated and alone). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  EVERYTOWN, supra note 17, at 2. 
 63.  See ACADV, supra note 31. 
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the road of pushing even further usually must come to the decision to 
leave if she is to make the abuse stop.64 
Leaving an abusive relationship comes with seemingly 
insurmountable challenges.  Often, the abuser has cut the victim off from 
access to money by confiscating her paychecks or making sure that she 
does not have a job.65  Thus, she may be financially unable to support 
herself or her children if she leaves.66  The abuser usually keeps his 
victim isolated, destroying relationships she had with family or friends.67  
Then, when his victim wants to leave, she often has no one to whom she 
can turn.68  Most significantly, the victim runs the risk of being killed if 
she does try to flee.69  Because of the abuser’s isolation tactics and 
propensity for violence, the victim will normally need help to survive an 
escape. 
First instincts suggest that a victim should call the police for help.  If 
the abuser is arrested for his acts of violence, this will accomplish two 
things: the victim will have a clear path to escape as long as the 
perpetrator is in custody, and the abuser will theoretically have to answer 
for his actions.  However, this is only helpful if there has been an 
incident of physical violence or a threat of physical violence,70 and even 
then, arrest does not always result in conviction.71  There are some IPV 
relationships that never see physical or sexual violence.72  In these 
instances, the victim cannot turn to the criminal justice system. 
A civil protection order can help a victim secure her safety when 
trying to leave a violent relationship.  These orders are entered by a state 
court and can order a variety of things, from prohibiting abuse to 
requiring the surrender of any firearms to mandating that the abuser have 
no contact with the victim.73  The orders are governed by state statute.74 
                                                          
 64.  Id. 
 65.  BERRY, supra note 49, at 117. 
 66.  ACADV, supra note 31. 
 67.  BERRY, supra note 49, at 117. 
 68.  ACADV, supra note 31. 
 69.  EVERYTOWN, supra note 17. 
 70.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2401 (2007) (only permitting arrest when there is probable 
cause that a crime has been committed). 
 71.  See Andrew R. Klein, Practical Implications of Current Domestic Violence Research: For 
Law Enforcement, Prosecutors, and Judges, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE (June 2009), http://www. 
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225722.pdf (reporting that the average prosecution rate after an IPV arrest is 
63.8% but is as low as 4.6% in some jurisdictions). 
 72.  NCADV, supra note 34. 
 73.  Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered Women: 
An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 910–34 (1993). 
 74.  See Domestic Violence Civil Protection Orders (CPOs) By State, AM. BAR ASSOC. 
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When a victim wants a protection order, she files a petition with the 
local state court.  Generally, these orders can be granted on an 
emergency and temporary ex parte basis.75  This means that the order is 
granted immediately and takes effect as soon as the abuser is served with 
papers.76  How long this ex parte order lasts depends on the state law 
where it was obtained.77  Some states mandate a hearing within two 
weeks of service to determine if the ex parte order will become final.78  
Other states allow longer time.79  Some states will leave the order in 
place indefinitely unless the abuser decides to request a hearing.80  While 
ultimately these orders are just a court order on a piece of paper, they 
have proved successful for some in combating IPV and helping victims 
to escape to safety.81 
C. Intimate Partner Violence and Guns 
Some victims survive IPV, and some manage to escape, often with 
the help of civil protection orders.82  Too frequently this is not the case, 
and the IPV lasts the entire life of the abuser, or it ends with the murder 
of the victim.83  When an abuser has access to a firearm, the likelihood 
that the abuse ends in murder dramatically increases.84  An abused 
woman is five times more likely to be murdered if her abuser owns a 
gun.85  Assaults on an intimate partner or family member are twelve 
times more likely to end in death when a firearm is involved.86 
                                                          
COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (June 2007), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/domviol/docs/DVCPOChartJune07.authcheckdam.pdf (outlining each state statute 
governing civil protection orders). 
 75.  Klein & Orloff, supra note 73, at 1037. 
 76.  Id. at 1067. 
 77.  Id. at 1086–87. 
 78.  Id. at 1040. 
 79.  Id. at 1040–42. 
 80.  Id. at 1085. 
 81.  See id. at 813 (identifying the factors that contribute to the effectiveness of protection 
orders). 
 82.  See id. at 974. 
 83.  See When Men Murder Women: An Analysis of 2009 Homicide Data, VIOLENCE POLICY 
CTR. (Sept. 2011), http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2011.pdf [hereinafter 2009 Homicide Data]. 
 84.  Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting Access to Firearms 
by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner Homicide?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 
314 (2006). 
 85.  Domestic Violence and Policy Firearms Summary, LAW CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE 
(May 11, 2014), http://smartgunlaws.org/domestic-violence-firearms-policy-summary/ [hereinafter 
Firearms Policy Summary]. 
 86.  Linda E. Saltzman et al., Weapon Involvement and Injury Outcomes in Family and Intimate 
Assaults, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N, 3043, 3046 (1992). 
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In 2009, at least 1,818 women were the victims of homicide.87  An 
intimate partner perpetrated at least sixty-three percent of these 
homicides.88  More than half of the 2009 female victims were murdered 
with a gun.89  Because the study that produced those results excluded ex-
boyfriends from the killers, the number is likely even higher.90 
Abusers use guns for more than murder.91  A gun is often a tool in 
forcing the victim to stay in the abusive relationship.92  The abuser will 
threaten to kill himself, his victim, or the victim’s children if she tries to 
leave.  IPV literature suggests that even the mere possession of a firearm 
without these explicit threats can achieve the same threatening result, 
causing the victim to stay in the relationship out of fear.93  Often, the 
violence is at its worst immediately after a victim attempts to leave the 
batterer, so the fear is not unrealistic.94 
Guns are a problem even when a protection order is in effect.  
Abusers violate protection orders.95  Studies show that violations range 
from twenty-three percent in two years to sixty percent in one year.96  
When an abuser has a firearm during that violation, results can be 
deadly.97  A Massachusetts study shows that abusers subject to protective 
orders who had access to firearms were more likely to attempt homicide 
or threaten partners with guns than those who had been forced to 
relinquish their weapons.98  Unless the protection order mandates the 
confiscation of firearms, the abuser could have a firearm in his 
                                                          
 87.  2009 Homicide Data, supra note 83, at 3 (explaining in 2009 there were 1,818 females in 
single victim/single offender homicide). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 7 (noting the number of times guns were used in a homicides where the weapon could 
be identified). 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Michelle N. Deutchman, Getting the Guns: Implementation and Enforcement Problems 
with California Senate Bill 218, 75 S. CALIF. L. REV. 185, 186 (2001) (“Although domestic violence 
can take many forms, abusers often use firearms to threaten, injure, or kill their victims.”); see also 
2009 Homicide Data, supra note 83, at 1 (“Gun use does not need to result in a fatality to involve 
domestic violence.”). 
 92.  See Deutchman, supra note 91, at 186. 
 93.  Vigdor & Mercy, supra note 84.  
 94.  Gold, supra note 35, at 940. 
 95.  Klein, supra note 71.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  See Firearms Policy Summary, supra note 85 (summarizing statistics illustrating the high 
likelihood of homicide when an abuser has a firearm). 
 98.  Id. 
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possession.99  Statistics reveal numerous homicides perpetrated by 
abusers who were prohibited from having a firearm.100 
D. Legislative Response to IPV 
Until recently, little legislation spoke specifically to the IPV 
epidemic.101  If addressed at all, domestic violence had to be combated 
through general criminal assault statutes or regular civil restraining 
orders.102  Beginning in the 1970s, lawmakers started responding to IPV 
at both the state and federal level.103  The statutes allowing protection 
orders were among the first answers104 to demands for action.105  By the 
1990s, every state offered some type of civil protection order.106  
Congress followed this state response, first with federal funds to assist 
victims, and eventually with the inclusion of domestic violence in new 
crime bills in an effort to specifically criminalize IPV.107  Legislation has 
also addressed the issue of gun violence in abusive relationships at both 
the state and federal level.108 
1. The Current State of Federal Domestic Violence and Gun Law 
Current federal law aims to keep IPV victims safe by taking guns out 
of the hands of abusers.109  This goal is reflected in two separate 
provisions.110  One of these provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9), is 
commonly known as the Lautenberg Amendment.111  It effectively 
prohibits anyone convicted of a domestic violence misdemeanor from 
                                                          
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Kellie K. Player, Expanding Protective Order Coverage, 43 ST. MARY’S L.J. 579, 584 
(2012). 
 102.  Alison J. Nathan, At the Intersection of Domestic Violence and Guns: The Public Interest 
Exception and the Lautenberg Amendment, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 830 (2000). 
 103.  Player, supra note 101, at 584. 
 104.  Id. at 583–84. 
 105.  See, e.g., Patricia Sully, Taking it Seriously: Repairing Domestic Violence Sentencing in 
Washington State, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 963 (2001).  
 106.  Player, supra note 101, at 584 (citing Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and Unequal 
Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 99–100 (2005); Kit 
Kinports & Karla Fischer, Orders of Protection in Domestic Violence Cases: An Empirical 
Assessment of the Impact of the Reform Statutes, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 163, 165 (1993)).  
 107.  Nathan, supra note 102, at 830. 
 108.  Id. at 830–31. 
 109.  Id. at 824–26. 
 110.  18 U.S.C. § 922 (2012). 
 111.  Nathan, supra note 102, at 837. 
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possessing a firearm.112  The amendment received overwhelming 
support, passing with a vote of ninety-seven to two in the Senate.113  The 
support was bolstered by the fact that domestic violence convictions are 
commonly plea bargained down from felonies to misdemeanors, 
allowing abusers to escape existing felon firearm bans.114 
The Lautenberg Amendment was preceded by 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), 
which prohibits persons subject to a protection order from possessing a 
firearm.115  Under this firearm prohibition, the firearm restriction is 
effective only after the abuser has had notice of a hearing and an 
opportunity to respond, and there has been either a finding of abuse or an 
order mandating that the abuser refrains from abusing, harassing or 
stalking the victim.116  Unlike the Lautenberg Amendment, this firearm 
prohibition contains an exemption for members of the police force or 
military.117 
While this protective order statute is one of federal creation and 
consequence, the provisions are enforced at the state level.118  The 
amendment establishes a federal offense in the possession of a firearm 
when one is subject to a state protective order, but leaves the entrance of 
the protective order to the discretion of state trial courts.119  The statute is 
also devoid of any process or mechanism to ensure that guns are actually 
relinquished if and when an order is entered.120 
2. State Approaches to IPV and Guns 
State approaches to domestic violence and firearms vary greatly.121  
Some states mandate seizure of firearms whenever an officer is at the 
scene of an IPV incident.122  Others prohibit anyone with a domestic 
violence conviction from keeping or buying a gun.123  A majority of the 
state legislation aimed at IPV comes in the form of restrictions when 
                                                          
 112.  18 U.S.C. § 922. 
 113.  Nathan, supra note 102, at 826 n.31. 
 114.  Id. at 837. 
 115.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) (2012). 
 116.  Id. § 922(g)(8)(A). 
 117.  Nathan, supra note 102, at 836. 
 118.  See id. at 826. 
 119.  Vainik, supra note 45, at 1136. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  Id. at 1123. 
 122.  Id. at 1123–24. 
 123.  Id. 
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someone is subject to a protective order.124  Many states allow or require 
courts issuing the order to mandate the surrender or confiscation of a 
firearm owned by the abuser.125 
Thirty-six states and Washington D.C. have legislation that either 
permits or requires a court to forbid firearm possession and purchase by 
abusers subject to a protective order.126  At least five of these states 
prohibit the purchase or possession upon the entrance of an ex parte 
protection order.127  At least three states require or authorize law 
enforcement to remove the weapons from an abuser.128  California even 
permits a search warrant if the subject will not voluntarily hand over his 
firearms.129  However, other states—Kansas among them—have no 
mention of firearm surrender or removal whatsoever.130 
3. How State and Federal Gun Laws Work Together 
The absence of any provision in the federal gun laws designating 
process or procedure for removing firearms puts a great amount of power 
and responsibility in the hands of state trial judges.131  These judges 
decide whether the federal statute will apply to a respondent because 
they decide if a protection order will be granted.132  The judges listen to 
the cases that the petitioners bring forward and decide, based on varying 
state statutes, whether there are grounds for a protection order.133  From 
here, what happens with an abuser’s firearm generally depends on what 
is included in that state’s statute.134 
Many of the current state protective order statutes give great 
deference to judicial discretion in deciding whether to enter an order and 
whether to prohibit the abuser from possessing or purchasing a gun.135  
This judicial discretion can have lethal consequences for a victim when 
the judge hearing her case does not understand the dynamics of IPV or 
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the seriousness of the situation.136  When this happens, the judge may 
engage in victim blaming, and put the responsibility of ending the abuse 
on the survivor instead of the abuser, surmising that the victim would 
just leave if there was really a problem.137  In this situation, the judge 
refuses to grant an order or prohibit firearm possession because they 
doubt the validity of the victim’s fear or the abuser’s potential for 
violence.  This leaves the victim with no protection, a very angry abuser, 
and little faith in the system that she reached out to for help. 
Judges may also be actively denying orders in an effort to avoid 
denying someone a right to a firearm, either because of personal belief or 
constitutional concerns.138  The latter attitude is often prevalent in avid 
hunting communities.139  Some commenters even believe that judges may 
be denying orders or firearm relinquishment demands because they 
would rather not be bothered.140  Confiscating firearms can be an 
administrative hassle and creates extra work.141  When a judge does not 
think that IPV is serious, it may be tempting to avoid the extra work and 
theoretically let the parties work it out themselves.142 
E. Nullification of Federal Law by the States 
There is a recent trend among the states to nullify federal gun 
laws.143  These state laws, referred to as Firearms Freedom Acts (FFAs), 
purport to void federal firearm restrictions so long as the weapons are 
created, sold and kept within state lines.144  The states’ agendas are 
propelled by the idea that the federal firearms laws are unconstitutional 
and therefore null and void.145 
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Nullification is a recycled theory—one that first arose in 1798 to 
oppose the Alien and Sedition Acts.146  Southern states revived the 
doctrine in 1832 in opposing federal tariffs.147  While both of these 
attempts were unsuccessful in establishing nullification as a successful 
method for challenging federal law, the theory returned when 
abolitionists used it to oppose the Fugitive Slave Act, and again after the 
Civil War in an effort to refuse federal action to end segregation.148  The 
doctrine was then put to rest until the 1990s, when states began 
permitting the use of medical marijuana in defiance of federal bans 
against the drug.149 
Today, the states have brought back the nullification theory, claiming 
that Congress has operated outside of the true reach of the Commerce 
Clause with its federal gun restrictions.150  These states assert that 
Congress has no power to regulate firearms of purely local commerce.151  
Nine states have successfully passed FFAs fueled by this idea.152  
Missouri almost joined the growing list in 2013 with a bill that would not 
only nullify federal gun laws within the state, but make it a crime for 
officers to enforce those laws.153  The governor vetoed the bill.154  While 
the FFAs have received a negative response from the federal courts,155 
they still stand in eight out of the nine states156 and have been introduced 
in many others.157 
1.  Nullification in Kansas 
Kansas is among the nine states that have enacted a nullification 
law.158  Governor Sam Brownback signed the Kansas FFA legislation in 
                                                          
 146.  See id. at 525–28. 
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2015] ENDING INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE 1101 
April 2013.159  This FFA, or the “Second Amendment Protection Act,” 
declares all firearms produced and kept in Kansas exempt from federal 
restrictions.160  It also prohibits any agency from enforcing those federal 
restrictions.161  According to the Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence, 
this FFA could have extensive effect, allowing “some federally 
prohibited people to buy and possess guns, prohibit federal background 
checks for gun purchases and allow the unlicensed manufacturing of 
firearms in Kansas, including guns designed to evade metal detectors and 
airport security screenings.  The law could also cripple investigations of 
gun trafficking and illegal gun sales.”162  Because the Lautenberg 
Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) are federal law, the Kansas FFA 
theoretically removes protections for IPV survivors that Congress 
implemented. 
The FFA’s destruction of the federal gun control amendments 
appears merely theoretical in nature because the federal government has 
openly declared that the law is unconstitutional.163  Shortly after the 
FFA’s enactment, Attorney General Eric Holder informed Governor 
Brownback that the law violated the Supremacy Clause and federal 
agencies would not observe its mandates.164  Federal firearms restrictions 
will continue to be enforced, said Holder, and Kansas will risk litigation 
if enforcement is impeded.165 
In fact, the FFA is already facing litigation, but from a different 
source.166  The Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence filed a lawsuit to 
strike down the law in July 2014.167  The complaint was filed in the U.S. 
District Court of Kansas.168  The Brady Center claims that the FFA is a 
violation of the Supremacy Clause and is unconstitutionally vague.169  
The Center argues that the firearms regulation is well within Congress’s 
reach under the Commerce Clause, and therefore it cannot be voided by 
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state legislation.170  The court has yet to hear any argument on the suit, 
but FFA advocates claim that even a successful legal challenge will not 
stop their efforts to eradicate gun restrictions.171  Patricia Stoneking, 
President of the Kansas State Rifle Association, explains that “[e]ven if 
Kansas’ law ends up being struck down in court, ‘We actually are not 
going to roll over and play dead and say, “Oh, no, shame on us”‘ . . . .  
‘The fight will not be over.’”172 
2.  What Nullification means for IPV 
Because it invalidates current federal firearm restrictions, the 
nullification trend could have an incredible impact on IPV.  The FFAs 
will result in “fewer registration and reporting requirements, fewer 
prohibitions on classes of people who may own firearms, and fewer 
restrictions on types of firearms.”173  If states elect to nullify federal gun 
laws, neither 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) nor the Lautenberg Amendment will 
prevent abusers from obtaining and possessing firearms within the states 
that have nullified federal law.174  While the high rate of IPV homicide 
suggests that the federal restrictions are far from enough in the battle to 
keep victims safe, they have provided a noticeable impact on the 
reduction of abusers with guns.175  Between 1998 and 2015, over 114,000 
IPV perpetrators were prevented from purchasing a firearm because of 
federal gun control laws.176 
F. Kansas Protective Order Laws 
Kansas offers two different types of civil protection orders for 
survivors of IPV.177  Petitioners who are or were in an intimate 
relationship with their abusers or lived in the same houses as their 
abusers may seek a protection from abuse order (PFA).178  The judge 
may grant the PFA if the petitioner can show one of the following three 
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things: (1) the abuser has intentionally caused bodily injury; (2) the 
abuser tried to cause bodily injury; or (3) the abuser intentionally made 
the victim fear she would receive bodily injury.179  Kansas also offers a 
protection from stalking order (PFS).180  Anyone who is the victim of 
intentional harassment that has made the victim fear for her safety may 
seek a PFS without having lived with or dated the stalker.181  Because 
this Comment concerns IPV, which is most regularly addressed through 
a PFA and not a PFS, the discussion will only addresses the PFA. 
The PFA can be entered on a temporary, ex parte basis, pending a 
hearing.182  The judge may enter the PFA ex parte if the petitioner can 
show good cause, defined as “immediate and present danger of abuse to 
the plaintiff.”183  The hearing for a PFA ex parte or regular petition must 
be scheduled within twenty days of the granting of the ex parte order or 
the entrance of the petition.184 
The PFA does not prohibit possession or purchase of firearms when 
someone is subject to the protective order.185  It does allow for judicial 
discretion in ordering any other needed relief, but the statutes are absent 
any mention of guns.186  While the entrance of a PFA can trigger 
922(g)(8), making it a federal offense for the respondent to possess a 
firearm, the federal provision has little effect on state level PFAs. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Separating abusers from their murder weapons is an essential action 
that can be accomplished with help from state legislatures.  This action 
can begin in Kansas.  Mandatory firearm removal and prohibition of 
firearm purchases upon entrance of an ex parte or permanent protection 
order due to physical violence is the first step.  In addition, judges should 
be afforded the ability to command firearm confiscation upon entrance of 
a protection order for forms of non-physical abuse.  With these new 
provisions, the protective order statute will also need to account for 
judges who do not enter orders because they are fearful of crossing 
constitutional lines or personal beliefs to gun rights.  Therefore, the 
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statute should mandate that orders are entered upon certain findings of 
fact.  Finally, the statute should outline a process for quicker appellate 
review.  These orders can be the difference between life and death.  
Should a judge’s strong ideals about a constitutional right to guns 
prevent her from entering an order, the victim should have an 
opportunity to have the decision reviewed before it is too late. 
A. Proposed Kansas Protective Order Reform 
1. Firearm Removal and Prohibition of Purchase 
There are a variety of firearm provisions among state protective 
order statutes, ranging from no restriction at all to orders that command 
police seizure of guns.187  Studies show that the statutes with more 
restrictive provisions are saving lives.188  After states pass these laws, 
intimate partner homicide decreases by eight percent.189  Because it will 
save the lives of its citizens, Kansas should implement more restrictive 
means. 
The Massachusetts protective order statute provides a good example 
of more restrictive legislation.  It mandates the following: 
Upon issuance of a temporary or emergency order . . . the court shall, if 
the plaintiff demonstrates a substantial likelihood of immediate danger 
of abuse, order the immediate suspension and surrender of any license 
to carry firearms and or firearms identification card which the 
defendant may hold and order the defendant to surrender all firearms, 
rifles, shotguns, machine guns and ammunition which he then controls, 
owns or possesses . . . . Law enforcement officials, upon the service of 
said orders, shall immediately take possession of all firearms, rifles, 
shotguns, machine guns, ammunition, any license to carry firearms and 
any firearms identification cards in the control, ownership, or 
possession of said defendant.190 
The court may issue the temporary order whenever it finds the order 
necessary to protect the petitioner from abuse.191  If issued, the 
respondent must have an opportunity to be heard within ten days of the 
order.192  If the respondent does not appear or give reason why the order 
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should not be continued, the judge will make the order permanent for one 
year.193  This will include the firearm prohibition.194 
In contrast, the Kansas protective order statutes say nothing about a 
firearm prohibition.195  The Legislature should amend these laws to 
incorporate mandates like those included in the Massachusetts statute.  
Specifically, the PFA statute should divide firearm prohibition into two 
categories: mandatory prohibition in situations of physical violence and 
optional prohibition in situations of non-physical violence.  Kansas law 
should command the surrender of firearms upon entrance of an 
emergency ex parte or permanent order when such an order is the result 
of actual, attempted, or threatened physical or sexual violence.  In 
addition, the statute should allow judges to order the confiscation of 
firearms when the abuser is perpetrating forms of non-physical violence.  
In either situation, the legislation should mandate police removal when 
weapons are not surrendered voluntarily. 
The statute should provide that the firearm prohibitions will stay in 
place until the PFA is lifted.  Upon termination of the order, any 
confiscated firearms will be returned to the respondent.  If firearms are 
confiscated upon entrance of an ex parte order and the permanent order is 
subsequently denied, the firearms will be returned to the respondent upon 
that denial.  If an ex parte order is denied but a permanent order entered, 
surrender of firearms will be mandated upon entrance of that permanent 
order.  The following is a possible example of the proposed legislation: 
The Court shall enter a protection from abuse order upon a finding of 
domestic abuse. 
This order shall mandate the surrender of all firearms and ammunition 
and prohibit the purchase of firearms and ammunition when there has 
been an incident of: 
(a) physical or sexual abuse; 
(b) attempted physical or sexual abuse; or 
(c) threatened physical or sexual abuse. 
The court may order the surrender of all firearms and ammunition and 
prohibit the purchase of firearms and ammunition when there is a 
presence of non-physical domestic abuse. 
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2. Implementation 
Because the proposed reform will not only command surrender of 
firearms, but mandate police confiscation when the firearms are not 
surrendered, the PFA orders need to be accompanied by search warrants.  
The New Hampshire protective order statute provides for such relief, 
declaring that: 
The court may subsequently issue a search warrant authorizing the 
peace officer to seize any deadly weapons specified in the protective 
order and any and all firearms and ammunition, if there is probable 
cause to believe such firearms and ammunition and specified deadly 
weapons are kept on the premises or curtilage of the defendant and if 
the court has reason to believe that all such firearms and ammunition 
and specified deadly weapons have not been relinquished by the 
defendant.196 
The Kansas PFA statute should include such a provision.  In the case 
of a temporary ex parte order, the warrant should be attached directly to 
the ex parte order when a judge grants an emergency PFA.  When law 
enforcement serves the respondent with the ex parte papers, the warrant 
will be ready to go in the event the abuser refuses to surrender weapons.  
If there is a permanent protection order without a prior ex parte order, the 
search warrant should be attached to that permanent order that is entered 
in the courtroom.  Respondents should then have the opportunity to turn 
over their weapons within seventy-two hours.  If weapons are not 
surrendered, law enforcement will secure the weapons with the prepared 
search warrant. 
Because the weapons will be returned to the respondents when the 
order is lifted, law enforcement will retain the weapons until the PFA 
expires.  Upon expiration of the order, the respondent should be afforded 
thirty days to retrieve his firearm.  After thirty days, any firearms will be 
destroyed or forfeited to law enforcement for use or sale, according to 
the Kansas confiscation statute.197  The following statutory proposal 
would incorporate these provisions: 
Upon entrance of a temporary or permanent protection from abuse 
order commanding the surrender of weapons, the court shall issue a 
search warrant allowing law enforcement to seize all firearms or 
ammunition named in the petition when there is probable cause to 
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believe such weapons or ammunition are in the respondent’s 
possession. 
Upon service of such order, the respondent must turn over all firearms 
and ammunition to the law enforcement officer providing service.  If 
the respondent does not surrender firearms voluntarily, the officer shall 
use the provided search warrant to enter the respondent’s premises and 
confiscate all firearms and ammunition. 
The firearm prohibition shall stay in effect until the protection from 
abuse order expires.  Upon expiration, the respondent shall have thirty 
days to retrieve confiscated firearms or ammunition from law 
enforcement.  After thirty days, confiscated material shall be disposed 
of in accordance with KSA § 22-2512. 
B. Eliminating Judicial Bias 
1. Mandating PFA Entrance 
Mandating the immediate confiscation of firearms upon entrance of a 
protection order could actually prove counterproductive if limits on 
judicial discretion are left unaddressed.  If judges with strong personal 
beliefs about a person’s right to bear arms are hesitant to enter orders 
without a state law that enters the arena of seizing firearms,198 surely the 
imposition of automatic confiscation will only intensify this hesitation.  
The solution is in further modification of the statute. 
The key lies in clear and unambiguous language that instructs the 
court to enter a protective order when certain circumstances exist.199  The 
current Kansas statute authorizing the issuance of a temporary PFA 
explains that “upon a finding of good cause shown, the court . . . may 
enter such temporary relief orders . . . as it deems necessary to protect the 
plaintiff or minor children.”200  The statute authorizing any permanent 
PFA says “[t]he court may . . . grant any of the following orders,” 
followed by a list of potential relief.201  These provisions are significant 
because by using the word “may,” the statute creates the necessity for 
judicial decision, which will be subject to each judge’s personal opinion 
and bias.  If instead, the statutes utilized the word “shall” and mandated 
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the entrance of an order under specific circumstances, judges would have 
less opportunity to interject personal decision-making and consequently 
subject the PFA entrance process to personal and potentially dangerous 
bias.202 
2. Expanding the Definition of Abuse 
While the use of the word “shall” will be helpful in excluding 
judicial bias, the statute must also expand the definition of abuse to close 
loopholes that judges wary of denying gun rights or unaware of the 
danger of IPV may utilize.  Currently, Kansas law allows a judge to enter 
a PFA to “bring about a cessation of abuse.”203  However, the definition 
of abuse is limited.204  The statute defines abuse as either physical abuse 
or sex with a minor under the age of sixteen when the minor is not the 
abuser’s spouse.205  Not only does the statute ignore sexual assault, it also 
ignores any non-physical forms of abuse.206 
The current definition leaves a great number of victims unprotected 
and could allow a wary judge to avoid entering a PFA when IPV is 
present in order to dodge any discussion of firearm restriction.  Because 
IPV is unfathomably powerful in the way that it psychologically controls 
a victim,207 this is a dangerous situation.  Many victims explain that the 
psychological abuse is often much worse than any physical violence.208  
Tactics range from constant emotional or verbal manipulation to threats 
to kidnap common children.209  Escape from this abuse may very well 
depend on a protective order.  Not only can the legal mandate provide 
physical separation from the manipulative abuser, the award of such an 
order also shifts the allocation of power within the relationship and 
forces the abuser into the public light, thus giving the victim the upper 
hand and a helpful boost to her psychological state.210 
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As noted, the Kansas statute does not allow for a protection order in 
sexually, financially, or psychologically abusive situations.211  To 
remedy this danger, the statute could expand the definition of abuse to 
include any abuse used or intended to exert control over the victim.  The 
Colorado legislative declaration concerning domestic violence provides a 
useful example of the type of language that should be included in a 
statutory definition of abuse.212  It recognizes the need for a protection 
order in the event of not only physical, but also sexual abuse.213  It then 
goes further, noting that “domestic abuse is not limited to physical 
threats of violence and harm but also includes mental and emotional 
abuse, financial control, document control, property control, and other 
types of control that make a victim more likely to return to an abuser due 
to fear of retaliation or inability to meet basic needs.”214  This language, 
coupled with mandatory enforcement when abuse exists, would bring the 
Kansas statute much closer to eliminating judicial bias and taking guns 
out of abusers’ hands.  The following provision would provide for such a 
result: 
The court shall enter a protection from abuse order when the 
preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondent has 
perpetrated domestic abuse against the petitioner. 
Abuse shall be defined as the occurrence of one or more of the 
following acts, whether actual, attempted, or threatened: 
(a) physical abuse; 
(b) sexual abuse; 
(c) non physical forms of abuse, including but not limited to mental, 
emotional or financial control; or 
(d) any other abusive act intended to coerce the petitioner into behavior 
from which he or she has the right to abstain. 
3. Mandate Judicial Training 
Another key component to protecting the lives of IPV victims falls 
on the judiciary.  No matter how explicit and clear a statute may be, a 
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judge must follow it or the statute will not have its intended effect.  
Unfortunately, in an area like IPV, the risk for judicial bias is great.215  It 
is a subject that is largely misunderstood,216 with a solution that threatens 
constitutional rights.217  The solution to ensuring that judges stay within 
the lines of the law lies in judicial training in the area of domestic 
violence.218 
With proper training, judges will obtain the tools to understand IPV 
and identify the abuse when it exists.219  Judges will know and appreciate 
that just because a woman does not leave an abusive relationship does 
not mean that the abuse is nonexistent or benign.220  Judges will 
understand that there are many ways to abuse someone, and no form of 
abuse is consistently less powerful than any other.221  This knowledge 
will provide the judges the ability to better identify abusive relationships 
and work to offer all possible legal protections. 
C. A Quicker Path to Appellate Review 
Because protection orders are “transitory in nature,” and the process 
of appealing a judgment is generally a long one, PFA decisions are rarely 
subject to appellate review.222  If a petitioner were to appeal a PFA 
denial, the case would likely be moot by the time it reached the bench.223  
The victim would either be dead, back with her abuser, or no longer 
subject to the abuse.  Thus, erroneous trial level decisions are not likely 
to be reversed. 
The result can be dangerous.  When a victim is attempting escape, 
she is at the most treacherous point of IPV.224  It is during this period that 
she is most likely to be murdered by her abuser.225  If a protection order 
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is wrongfully denied during this period, the victim is left without legal 
protection and faces an abuser who has seen no consequence for his 
actions.  The victim’s attempts to reach out for help, in the face of shame 
and fear, will have been rebuffed.  Without any real ability to appeal the 
decision, she could find herself in a deadly situation with no legal 
options. 
The potential danger of a wrongfully denied PFA creates a necessity 
for speedy access to appeals.  This necessity remains important under the 
proposed reform.  If mandated PFA implementation and judicial training 
does not prevent all judicial bias, the victims of IPV should have an 
avenue for review.  This can be accomplished with a statutorily 
prescribed avenue to an expedited appeal. 
Such avenues exist in other areas of the law, often in the juvenile 
arena.226  These examples can be imitated in the Kansas Protective Order 
statutes.  The expedited appeal process outlined in Georgia Statute § 15-
11-684 is a useful model.227  The provision provides a path to quick 
review when a juvenile court denies a youth’s request for waiver of 
parental consent to an abortion.228  The youth must file a notice of appeal 
within five days and then the court must render a decision within five 
days after receipt of that notice of appeal.229  If the waiver is again 
denied, the youth may file a motion for reconsideration within five days 
and the court of appeals has another five days to reconsider.230  When a 
motion for reconsideration is denied, the youth can petition the Georgia 
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari within twenty-four hours.231  The 
clerk has twenty-four hours to provide the petition to the Georgia 
Supreme Court, who shall then grant or deny the certiorari within two 
days.232  The court has five days after granting certiorari to render a 
decision.233  At its maximum, this appeals process will take no longer 
than twenty-nine days with the youth afforded three chances at review.234 
                                                          
 226.  See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2382 (Supp. 2014) (providing that an appeal from a juvenile 
adjudication must take place within thirty days); Gayle Nelson Vogel, Expediting Dependency 
Appeals, 26 CHILD.  L. PRAC. 139, 141 (2007) (explaining the benefits of Iowa’s expedited appellate 
procedure in juvenile law); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-684(e) (West Supp. 2014) (providing a path for 
quick review when a juvenile court denies a youth’s request for waiver of parental consent to an 
abortion). 
 227.  GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-684(e) (West Supp. 2014). 
 228.  Id. 
 229.  GA. APP. CT. R. 45. 
 230.  Id. 
 231.  GA. SUP. CT. R. 62. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  See id.; GA. APP. CT. R. 45. 
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If something similar to this Georgia appellate process is implemented 
in the Kansas PFA statute, IPV victims will retain a measure of safety 
during an incredibly dangerous period.  This is especially true if the ex 
parte orders remain in place until the victim refrains from appeal or the 
Kansas Supreme Court renders a decision denying the order.  Even in a 
case with no ex parte in place, if an abuser knows he is subject to more 
judicial scrutiny, the court appearance looming in his future may be 
enough to keep him from perpetrating any abuse in the interim. 
D. Withstanding Constitutional Challenge 
This proposal will likely face challenge under the Second 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  The amendment provides that “[a] 
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”235  In 
2008, the Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment confers an 
individual right to bear arms, thus limiting the government’s ability to 
restrict firearm possession.236  Because the proposed reform requires that 
the government prohibit firearm possession while a PFA is in place, 
opponents may challenge its mandate on a theory that this restriction 
violates an individual’s constitutional right to bear arms.  While such a 
challenge is almost guaranteed to find traction in the judicial system, it 
should not prevail.  The following analysis will reveal why the challenge 
should be denied, discussing the Second Amendment right, the 
requirements for constitutionally restricting this right, and the reasons 
that this proposal falls within those requirements. 
1. Defining the Right to Bear Arms 
Because the first ten amendments to the Constitution, or the Bill of 
Rights, historically applied only to the federal government,237 the Court 
returned to the Second Amendment discussion two years after its 
decision in Heller to determine the applicability of the provision to state 
actors.238  Until the late nineteenth century, state or private actors did not 
violate the first ten amendments by constricting any rights found 
therein.239  Over time, the Supreme Court greatly expanded the reach of 
                                                          
 235.  U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
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the Bill of Rights through a theory of incorporation.240  This theory 
provided that some rights were so fundamental they were protected as a 
liberty interest through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, a constitutional provision that does apply to state actors.241  The 
Supreme Court employed this incorporation theory when it returned to 
the Second Amendment discussion, holding that the right to bear arms 
would restrict state actors from interfering with that right just as it did the 
federal government.242 
This right is not without limits, however.243  The majority in Heller 
announced that certain firearm restrictions were presumptively lawful, 
providing a list of examples and noting that the list was not exhaustive.244  
The Court did not explain why the listed restrictions are presumptively 
lawful, or how lower courts should evaluate the constitutionality of other 
gun restrictions.245  The only guidance that the Court provided was to 
note that there must be a level of scrutiny that is higher than mere 
rational basis as the right is constitutionally enumerated.246  Thus, the 
only clear takeaway from Heller and McDonald is that there exists an 
individual right to a firearm, but that the federal or state government has 
the power to limit that right to some degree. 
2. Evaluating Gun Restrictions for Constitutional Validity 
This resolution leaves lower courts in the position of determining the 
constitutionality of any limit to a gun right when challenged in court.247  
Historically, courts have often applied one of three standards of review in 
determining whether a law violates a constitutional right:248 rational 
                                                          
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.6(a) (2014) (explaining that the Bill of Rights did not apply to 
state actors until after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment when the Court began identifying 
some of the rights as fundamental liberties protected by the Due Process Clause). 
 240. . McDonald, 561 U.S. at 744. 
 241. . Gerri L. Plain, Constitutional Law—Second Amendment—the Second Amendment Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms is Applicable to the States Through Incorporation of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 CUMB. L. REV. 161, 166 (2011).  
 242.  McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791. 
 243.  D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (noting that the Second Amendment right is not 
unlimited). 
 244.  Id. at 626–27 & n.26. 
 245.  Jeff Golimowski, Note, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun Laws in a Post-
Heller World, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1604 (2012). 
 246.  Heller, 544 U.S. at 628 n.27, 686.  
 247.  See Golimowski, supra note 245, at 1605. 
 248.  Lindsay Goldberg, Note, District of Columbia v. Heller: Failing to Establish a Standard 
for the Future, 68 MD. L. REV. 889, 891–92 (2009). 
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basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.249  The rational basis test is 
the easiest for a gun restriction to overcome, and will find a law 
constitutional so long as it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government interest.250  Intermediate scrutiny has a higher threshold, 
deeming a law constitutional when it is substantially related to an 
important government interest.251  Finally, strict scrutiny will only allow 
a law to stand when it is narrowly tailored to further a compelling 
government interest.252 
Until the Supreme Court articulates the appropriate standard for 
determining the constitutionality of gun restrictions, the opinions of the 
Kansas Supreme Court should ideally guide new reform of the Kansas 
PFA statute in an attempt to ensure constitutional validity.253  
Unfortunately, like the Supreme Court, Kansas has not determined the 
appropriate standard of review.254  Because the Kansas judiciary has not 
identified what level of scrutiny will apply if a firearm restriction is 
challenged, there is no adequate guide for ensuring any reform is 
constitutional.  However, this should pose little problem overall, as the 
proposed statute is capable of standing up to not only intermediate 
scrutiny, but strict scrutiny as well. 
3. Defining Intermediate Scrutiny 
Many courts outside Kansas have turned to intermediate scrutiny in 
evaluating the constitutionality of gun restrictions against the Second 
Amendment.255  Because this may make it more likely that a Kansas 
court will turn to this level of review if reform is challenged, this 
discussion turns first to that standard.  A Tenth Circuit decision provides 
a useful example.256 
                                                          
 249.  Id. 
 250.  Id. at 896. 
 251.  Id. at 897–98. 
 252.  Id. at 892. 
 253.  Any challenge to Kansas law is likely to begin in a Kansas state court.  Legislation should 
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In 2010, the Tenth Circuit held 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8)257 
constitutional as applied to a particular defendant after using a test of 
intermediate scrutiny.258  The Tenth Circuit did not address the 
constitutionality of the statute on its face because the defendant conceded 
its general validity after the district court found the amendment 
constitutional.259  Instead, the court assessed whether the act was 
unconstitutional in the specific circumstance of the named defendant.260 
In the beginning steps, the court recognized that the government had 
an important objective in enacting the amendment, which was to keep 
firearms out of the hands of potential abusers.261  The court pointed to 
findings in a Seventh Circuit decision in support of that conclusion.262  
The findings included various studies, one showing that domestic 
assaults with firearms were approximately twelve times more likely to 
end in homicide than assaults with knives or fists, another showing the 
high rate of recidivism among domestic violence offenders, and another 
that claimed eight percent of police fatalities were a result of officers’ 
attempts to control a domestic disturbance.263  According to the Tenth 
Circuit, these numbers demonstrated that keeping guns out of the hands 
of abusers was an undeniably important government objective.264 
The Tenth Circuit then assessed whether the means used to address 
this important objective were substantially related to the objective in the 
case at hand.265  The court decided that the defendant’s prosecution under 
§ 922(g)(8) was substantially related to the government’s interest in 
implementing the legislation because the underlying protective order to 
which the defendant was subject was tailored to certain kinds of abusers 
(those determined to have a propensity for violence) and complete with 
procedural protections.266 
                                                          
 257.  See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.  
 258.  See Reese, 627 F.3d at 803–04 (finding that the statute was constitutional as applied 
because it was consistent with an important government purpose). 
 259.  Id. at 800. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Id. at 802–03. 
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 265.  Id. at 803. 
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4. Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to the Proposed Reform 
Like § 922(g)(8) in the Tenth Circuit case, the statute proposed here 
for Kansas must be substantially related to an important government 
interest to pass a test of intermediate scrutiny.  The first hurdle is an easy 
one.  As in Reese,267 there is little question that the statute serves an 
important government interest.  The state naturally has an interest in 
protecting citizens from murder or abuse.  Statistics illustrate the high 
frequency of death threats268 and the strong likelihood of homicide when 
a domestic abuser possesses a firearm.269  Because the proposed statute 
aims to prevent these realities, the statute easily serves an important 
government interest. 
The second obstacle in the intermediate scrutiny test is identifying 
the proposed reform as substantially related to the objective.270  Because 
the reform suggests two different provisions that could separate a person 
from a firearm, the analysis must proceed in two separate discussions.  
The first proposal mandates firearm removal in the case of physical 
violence.  Showing that this is substantially related to an interest in 
preventing IPV homicide is not a difficult barrier to overcome.  Studies 
show that firearms and IPV are deadly.  One study reveals that seventy-
four percent of IPV homicide victims and eighty-eight percent of 
attempted IPV homicide victims had been seen in the emergency 
department in the year before their murder or attempted murder.271  This 
result supports the conclusion that abusers who murder their intimates 
present warning signs of physical violence. 
Another study revealed that around two thirds of women who lived 
in IPV situations where there was a gun in the home reported that their 
partners used the gun against them,272 giving weight to the assumption 
that more often than not, firearms will be used to abuse the victim when 
an abuser has access to the weapon.  A 2003 study revealed that a 
woman’s risk of homicide increases by 500 percent when a gun is 
                                                          
 267.  Id. at 802 (explaining that not even the challenger to the legislation heavily contests the 
assertion that keeping guns out of the hands of abusers is an important government interest). 
 268.  EVERYTOWN, supra note 17, at 4 (noting one study where two-thirds of women living in a 
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 269.  See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text. 
 270.  See supra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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VALIDATION STUDY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 3 (2005), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209 
731.pdf. 
 272.  Firearms Policy Summary, supra note 85. 
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present in an IPV situation.273  Because IPV murderers have shown to 
present warning signs of physical violence, and most abusers who own 
weapons use them against their victims, taking away the guns when an 
abuser shows signs of physical abuse is clearly related to the state’s 
interest in preventing IPV and IPV homicide. 
The other question in this piece of the analysis is whether allowing a 
judge to remove weapons when non-physical forms of IPV exist is also 
substantially related to the government interest.  Upon first glance, the 
link between financial, emotional, or psychological abuse and gun 
violence may seem too attenuated to support the idea that removing 
weapons from a psychological abuser will prevent the murder or 
continued abuse of a partner.  However, as this discussion reveals, the 
attenuation is not so great.  The literature on domestic violence 
repeatedly declares two things: the violence in IPV relationships 
generally begins benignly and escalates over time,274 and the moment of 
escape is often the most dangerous point in a victim’s life.275 
The psychology behind convincing a woman to love a person who is 
throwing her head against a wall is slow, intricate, and systematic.276  
Thus, victims often do not even realize that they are in a dire situation 
until physical violence is already present.277  However, if a victim tries to 
extricate herself early in the relationship, before any physical violence 
has started, she could be in just as much danger as the woman who has 
been subject to physical abuse for years.278  Thus, allowing a judge to 
remove a firearm when she finds non-physical abuse present in a 
relationship is still substantially related to the state’s interest in avoiding 
IPV and IPV homicide.  An evaluation of this provision should take 
special notice that it does not mandate the removal of firearms upon a 
finding of non-physical abuse.  While mandated entrance would almost 
surely pass a rational basis test,279 this more generous provision will 
                                                          
 273.  Id. 
 274.  See Abuse Defined, THE NAT’L DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HOTLINE, http://www.thehot 
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allow the test to pass higher levels of scrutiny because it does not 
automatically subject all abusers to Second Amendment restrictions.280 
Finally, the limited time frame of the protective orders will greatly 
assist the proposed reform in withstanding the intermediate scrutiny of a 
court.  Any confiscation of firearms, either statutorily or judicially 
mandated, will not be indefinite.  This proposal does not attempt to 
extend the length of the current PFA, which generally lasts no longer 
than one year unless it is extended for another year upon motion of the 
victim.281  Thus, the means used to meet the government’s interest in 
protecting IPV victims are targeted directly at those likely to perpetrate 
IPV and are very limited in duration.  Consequently, these means are 
substantially related to the government’s objective. 
5. Defining Strict Scrutiny 
While intermediate scrutiny is the most invoked and thus most likely 
applicable standard of review, some courts turn to strict scrutiny when 
fleshing out the constitutional validity of a gun restriction.282  These 
courts will only uphold a restriction if they find it furthers a compelling 
government interest and the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve 
that interest.283  Generally reserved for the protection of fundamental 
rights and suspect classes, this is the highest standard of review and thus 
more difficult to overcome.284  While often described as “strict in theory 
and fatal in fact,” strict scrutiny actually upholds challenged regulations 
in thirty percent of applications.285  Thus, while the analysis presents a 
more demanding challenge than lower levels of scrutiny, it appears that 
the test is not “fatal in fact,” but rather “survivable in fact.”286 
The first step in withstanding a strict scrutiny challenge is to identify 
a compelling government interest that the challenged regulation 
                                                          
 280.  United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 804 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the gun 
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serves.287  The Supreme Court has not articulated specific criteria for a 
compelling interest, and indeed, the definitions and types of such 
interests vary throughout case law and legal writing, and likely depend 
on the subject matter at stake.288  The language used seems to generally 
describe compelling interests as those that are “only the most pressing 
circumstances,”289 or a “vital interest.”290  Examples of interests the 
Supreme Court has found compelling include “remedying the effects of 
past intentional discrimination,”291 securing diversity in higher 
education,292 “protecting [the] potential life” of an unborn fetus,293 
“removing the victims of child abuse from their parents,”294 and 
maintaining highway safety.295 
In evaluating gun restrictions, a number of lower courts have found 
compelling interests behind regulations aimed at keeping the public safe.  
When the Third Circuit affirmed the conviction of a defendant for 
possessing a handgun with an obliterated serial number, the court held 
that the serial number tracking system helped law enforcement collect 
valuable information from recovered weapons and was thus a compelling 
interest.296  The First Circuit upheld a Massachusetts law that required 
applications for firearms licenses to contain accurate information, subject 
to revocation of a license or criminal conviction for knowingly false 
reporting.297  The court held that the law would pass even the highest 
level of scrutiny, thus identifying the truthful information requirement as 
a compelling interest.298  In an application of intermediate scrutiny, the 
Seventh Circuit wasted no time in deeming the reduction of domestic 
gun violence an important government interest after noting that the 
Supreme Court had already found such an interest compelling.299  Kansas 
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has also found compelling interests for certain gun restrictions.300  In 
2010, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld a statute prohibiting felons 
from possessing firearms when it named the state’s goal of protecting the 
citizenry a compelling interest.301 
The second prong of the strict scrutiny test requires that the means 
used to further the compelling interest be narrowly tailored.302  There is 
slightly more guidance for this piece of the analysis than exists for 
defining a compelling interest.303  Some literature suggests that an 
investigation into whether a regulation is narrowly tailored generally 
proceeds in a series of parts.304  According to this explanation, a court 
will first ensure that the restriction will actually further the asserted 
compelling interest.305  The court then inquires whether the regulation is 
overinclusive, meaning the regulation “restricts a significant amount of 
[behavior] that doesn’t implicate the government interest.”306  Next, the 
court examines whether the regulation is underinclusive, or “fails to 
restrict a significant amount of [behavior] that harms the government 
interest.”307  Finally, the court ensures that the regulation presents the 
least restrictive means possible of furthering the government interest.308  
Commentators note, however, that the Supreme Court has not been 
consistent in this analysis, and has upheld laws that seemingly fail at 
least one part of the aforementioned assessment.309 
Examples of narrowly tailored interests may be helpful in painting a 
picture of the second prong of strict scrutiny.  In 1988, the Supreme 
Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of 
residences or dwellings, declaring the regulation narrowly tailored to the 
city’s purpose of protecting residential privacy because it was “narrowly 
                                                          
the court held that the government’s interest in preventing crime was compelling.  Id. (citing United 
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987)).  
 300.  State v. Curtiss, No. 102,604, 2010 WL 4977222, at *3 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2010). 
 301.  Id. 
 302.  Matthew D. Bunker et al., Strict in Theory, but Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict 
Scrutiny and the Protection of Speech, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 349, 350 (2011).  
 303.  Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict 
Scrutiny, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2421–24 (1996) (describing a four-part analysis for determining 
whether a regulation is narrowly tailored).  
 304.  Id. 
 305.  Id. at 2422. 
 306.  Id. 
 307.  Id. at 2423. 
 308.  Id. at 2422. 
 309.  Fallon, supra note 287, at 1328–29.  
2015] ENDING INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE 1121 
directed at the household, not the public,” and “[left] open ample 
alternative channels of communication.”310 
In contrast, in 1982 the Supreme Court refused to sanction a state 
statute prohibiting the general public from criminal trials when it held it 
was not narrowly tailored to either of the state’s purported goals.311  The 
state argued that the law helped to ensure the well-being of minors in the 
courtroom and encourage minor victims of sex crimes to come forward 
and provide testimony.312  As to the first goal, the Court reasoned that the 
interest could be achieved by closing the courtroom on a case-by-case 
basis, rather than excluding the general public at large in every trial.313  
Turning to the second interest, the Court pointed out that the state had 
provided no support for the connection between the regulation and an 
increased number of sex victims coming forward to cooperate, thus 
failing to show that the regulation would further the interest.314  
Similarly, in 2007, the Supreme Court held that a student assignment 
plan that relied on race classification was not narrowly tailored when the 
school failed to show that the plan was necessary to achieve its goal of 
educational and social benefits.315 
For examples of narrowly tailored gun restrictions, one must turn to 
lower court decisions.  In United States v. Marzzarella, the Third Circuit 
found the statute criminalizing the possession of a gun without a serial 
number narrowly tailored because it did not limit the possession of an 
otherwise lawful firearm and thus did not burden more possession than 
necessary.316  The Tenth Circuit, while applying intermediate scrutiny in 
an evaluation of § 922(g)(8), reported that the restriction would 
withstand strict scrutiny as a narrowly tailored regulation, because it only 
mandated firearm restriction for persons subject to a certain kind of 
domestic protection order.317  Closer to home, the Kansas Court of 
Appeals held that the statute prohibiting felons from possessing firearms 
passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test after noting that it did 
not “prevent all criminals from possessing firearms for an indeterminate 
period of time.  Rather, the statute [was] tailored to prohibit possession 
of firearms for varying periods of time depending upon the nature of the 
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underlying crime.”318  The court placed additional significance on the 
fact that “even the most violent felons are not subject to a lifetime ban on 
firearm possession.”319 
6. Strict Scrutiny and the Proposed Reform 
The preceding discussion reveals the hurdles of the strict scrutiny 
test but also the high potential for the proposed firearm restriction to 
surpass its barriers.  The first prong should pose little trouble.  The cited 
examples illustrate the breadth of compelling interests that the judiciary 
has recognized.320  Each noted example centers around protecting 
citizens from some kind of evil or danger.  Crime prevention, highway 
safety, privacy, and abuse elimination all top the list of recognized 
priorities.321  The prevention of intimate partner homicide or abuse is 
consistent with this list.  In fact, Kansas has specifically recognized the 
protection of the citizenry as a compelling interest when imposing gun 
restrictions.322  Because the proposed restriction purports to do just this, a 
reviewing court would likely find the purpose behind the proposed 
restriction a compelling interest. 
The narrow tailoring requirement would face greater challenge.  
While the Supreme Court does not always engage the four part analysis 
mentioned previously,323 for the sake of assessing whether the proposed 
reform could withstand even the strictest of scrutiny, this Comment 
assumes that each piece would be utilized by a reviewing court.  First, 
the reform must actually address the compelling interest it seeks to 
achieve.324  Research shows that when abusers possess firearms, the 
chance of homicide soars.325  Admittedly, this statistic alone does not 
prove that removing firearms through protection orders will lower the 
statistic.  However, when buttressed by a study showing that intimate 
partner homicide decreases by an average of eight percent when 
protection orders prohibit firearm possession,326 the first statistic 
becomes more important.  The proposed reform has proven responsive in 
lowering the soaring chance of homicide when an abuser has a 
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weapon.327  Consequently, prohibiting known abusers from possessing 
weapons is narrowly tailored insofar as it will address the government’s 
compelling interest. 
Narrow tailoring also requires that the restriction is neither 
underinclusive nor overinclusive.328  To avoid being underinclusive, the 
reform cannot ignore substantial parts of the problem that the restriction 
seeks to address.329  Because this statute focuses specifically on those 
perpetrating abuse, and not just those who have been convicted of a 
domestic violence crime, it hones in on all of the parties with potential to 
use a firearm against a victim.  One study revealed that only twelve 
percent of reported IPV offenses result in a conviction.330  Were the 
statute to ignore all abusers who were not included in that twelve 
percent, the reform would teeter dangerously close to underinclusive.  
The inclusivity of all abusers creates the opposite effect. 
The reform evades an overinclusive status so long as it does not 
substantially regulate behavior that does not implicate the compelling 
interest.331  Opposition to the proposed reform may correctly point out 
that not all who are subject to a protective order will murder or abuse 
their partners.  This is undoubtedly true.  However, the proposed 
restriction will not be imposed without reason or review.  An emergency 
protection order, while imposed ex parte, is still imposed by a judge, 
after a review of alleged fact and a determination that the petitioner is 
being abused.  A full protection order is only awarded after a hearing in 
which the alleged abuser will have the opportunity to be heard and 
disprove the allegations. 
Further, both forms of protection order are limited in duration.  The 
emergency ex parte expires after three weeks and the permanent order 
remains in place no longer than one year.  These factors limit the reach 
of the restriction, ensuring it is not overinclusive.  Like the prohibition of 
firearms for felons that was evaluated by the Kansas Court of Appeals,332 
the focus on perpetrators of violence and the limited duration of this 
restriction is a strong indicator of narrow tailoring. 
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Finally, the reform must be the least restrictive means of achieving 
the government interest.333  This is the most challenging obstacle for the 
proposed reform.  The statute’s broad inclusion of all who are subject to 
a protection order, potentially (although temporarily) before they have a 
chance to be heard, appears overly restrictive.  A look to alternative 
restrictions may help to evaluate if this is in fact the least restrictive 
method.  The first alternative is perhaps the most obvious: the 
elimination of mandated firearm removal upon entrance of a temporary 
protection order entered ex parte.  This would undoubtedly result in a 
less restrictive statute.  However, excluding this provision would reduce 
the effectiveness of the statute and create potential for an underinclusive 
statute.  Studies reveal that the most dangerous time for a victim is when 
she tries to leave.334  Abolishing the mandated firearm removal upon 
entrance of an emergency order could render a PFA totally ineffective—
if the abuser has a deadly weapon, he may use it when his victim tries to 
escape, or the victim may not even attempt to leave.  Consequently, 
while this would be less restrictive, it would not be as effective in 
achieving the government interest.  Another less restrictive reform would 
be removing firearms only when there is a domestic violence conviction.  
However, as discussed above, there are a very small number of 
convictions compared to reported offenses.335  Thus, such a limited 
restriction would disregard the majority of abuse perpetrators, resulting 
in a statute that barely attends to the government interest. 
The failure to identify a less restrictive means may still fall short of 
demonstrating that this reform is as narrow as required by strict scrutiny.  
To support the assertion that this restriction is indeed narrowly tailored, 
one can turn to the fact that the reform does not mandate firearm removal 
for all abusers.  The proposed statute only commands that guns be turned 
over when there is actual or threatened physical or sexual abuse.  With 
all other forms of abuse, the option to confiscate firearms is left to the 
judge.  This detail may prove to be the pressure valve that satisfies the 
concerns of those dedicated to strictly upholding Second Amendment 
rights.  The statute will not take firearms from all abusers, only those 
who prove to be the most violent and the most dangerous to the physical 
well being of their victims. 
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Thus, while intermediate scrutiny appears to be the emerging choice 
for evaluating gun restrictions,336 in the event that courts apply a higher 
level of scrutiny, the proposed reform should still withstand review.  
Because protecting the people from abuse and homicide is an imperative 
goal, and the reform is both limited in duration and only applicable to the 
most violent abusers, the proposed reform has a high chance of enduring 
a strict scrutiny analysis. 
E. The Importance of Reform in Today’s Political Climate 
This reform is even more necessary today than in the past.  State 
laws that purport to nullify federal firearms regulations are sweeping the 
country.337  While the federal government has dismissed Kansas’s 
nullification law as unconstitutional and invalid, the legislation remains 
on the books.338  Kansas is quite possibly of the mindset that § 922(g)(8) 
will not apply to abusers so long as their weapons were created inside 
and kept within state lines.339  This is a dangerous mindset. 
Even if the nullification manifests no legal consequence and the 
federal government continues to prosecute under § 922(g)(8),340 its 
influence on judges reviewing PFA cases could be dramatic.  Judges in 
Kansas may be informing abusers that under federal law they cannot 
possess a firearm while subject to a PFA, thus potentially reducing the 
number of abusers with deadly weapons in their possession.  If Kansas 
insists that this is not necessarily the law as it applies to Kansans with 
Kansas guns, those judges may refrain from telling abusers they must 
hand over their weapons.  This not only strips the victim of any 
protection the judge’s reminder to the abuser may provide, but 
potentially leaves the respondent unaware that he is committing a federal 
offense by keeping his firearm.  Because it is lethally dangerous to allow 
abusers to keep weapons that they are likely to employ as a tool of abuse, 
and because the nullification law eliminates protections the victims 
currently have under federal law, Kansas should enact the proposed 
reform and mandate removal of these weapons. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
This reform is more than necessary in the fight to save the lives of 
IPV victims and end abuse.  Women are murdered at the hands of 
intimate partners every year, most often when their partners are pointing 
a firearm.341  There is little reason to allow abusers to hold on to firearms 
when statistics show that doing so is fundamental in increasing IPV 
homicide. 
The new statute should not only mandate the removal of these 
firearms when there is physical abuse present or threatened, but it should 
allow a judge to remove firearms upon the presence of non-physical 
forms of abuse.  Because the most dangerous time in an IPV relationship 
is when a woman tries to escape,342 a judge should have the power to 
remove a firearm when doing so will be important in saving the victim’s 
life or helping her escape.  In addition to this reform, Kansas should 
mandate substantial IPV training for any judge who may hear PFA cases.  
This will help prevent judicial bias because of a belief in gun rights.343 
Finally, the statute should provide an avenue for expedited appeal.  
Because judges can make mistakes, and in this setting a mistake could 
mean the victim’s life, there must be a process for prompt appeal.  These 
reforms will put Kansas on the path to ending IPV and saving its victims 
from homicide. 
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED STATUTE 
The court shall enter a protection from abuse order when the 
preponderance of the evidence shows that the respondent has 
perpetrated domestic abuse against the petitioner. 
Abuse shall be defined as the occurrence of one or more of the 
following acts, whether actual, attempted, or threatened: 
(a) physical abuse; 
(b) sexual abuse; 
(c) non physical forms of abuse, including but not limited to mental, 
emotional or financial control; or 
(d) any other abusive act intended to coerce the petitioner into behavior 
from which he or she has the right to abstain. 
This order shall mandate the surrender of all firearms and ammunition 
and prohibit the purchase of firearms and ammunition when there has 
been an incident of: 
(a) physical or sexual abuse; 
(b) attempted physical or sexual abuse; or 
(c) threatened physical or sexual abuse. 
The court may order the surrender of all firearms and ammunition and 
prohibit the purchase of firearms and ammunition when there is a 
presence of non-physical domestic abuse. 
Upon entrance of a temporary or permanent protection from abuse 
order commanding the surrender of weapons, the court shall issue a 
search warrant allowing law enforcement to seize all firearms or 
ammunition named in the petition when there is probable cause to 
believe such weapons or ammunition are in the respondent’s 
possession. 
Upon service of such order, the respondent must turn over all firearms 
and ammunition to the law enforcement officer providing service.  If 
the respondent does not surrender firearms voluntarily, the officer shall 
use the provided search warrant to enter the respondent’s premises and 
confiscate all firearms and ammunition. 
The firearm prohibition shall stay in effect until the protection from 
abuse order expires.  Upon expiration, the respondent shall have thirty 
days to retrieve confiscated firearms or ammunition from law 
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enforcement.  After thirty days, confiscated material shall be disposed 
of in accordance with KSA § 21-6307. 
 
